Ein Mikra Yotzeh Miydei Peshuto

There are a number of commentaries on the Torah that are based on a plain literal reading of the text (pshat). This approach views the function of words as static and fixed, like numbers and other intelligible indicators. Based on this methodology of interpretation, words must not change according to the wishes of the reader; rather they relate the message of the author to readers, according to the manner in which words are commonly understood by the public of the time of the text’s composition (unless indicated otherwise).

One luminous legal figure who is not generally grouped with the famous pashtanim is the underappreciated Provençal scholar, R. Abraham b. David (Raavad, c. 1125–1198). In his glosses to the widely recognized legal work, the Mishne Torah of Maimonides, Raavad notes his disagreements with some of Maimonides’ opinions and adds some additional legal insight that he might have omitted. Among these glosses, we can detect Raavad being guided by an approach of the plain reading of the verses in a number of different contexts.

Philosophical

Raavad famously applied his approach to the question of whether anthropomorphism is considered heresy. Maimonides’ position regarding the anti-anthropomorphic nature of God, and that belief otherwise is heresy, is the most commonly accepted position on the matter in contemporary times, but this was not always the case. As Raavad records in his glosses to Mishne Torah (Laws of Repentance 3:7), there were men of his time who took a more literal approach to anthropomorphic biblical terminology: “And why does he refer to such [an individual] as a heretic? For many [sages] greater and better than he (Maimonides) followed this train of thought according to their view of the Scriptures…” While Maimonides might categorize those who proclaim anthropomorphic qualities of God as “heretics”,¹ following Raavad’s theory, there would be no violation in professing one’s belief in a physical hand, eye, or finger of God,² even if such a view is, in fact, incorrect, since that person is simply following the pshat meaning of the verses.

In another case of a philosophical matter judged according to the plain meaning of the text, Raavad disagrees with the view of Maimonides regarding the Messianic era. Maimonides, based on TB Sanhedrin 91b and 99a, records that the Messianic era will fundamentally differ from all the eras that precede it only insofar as there will be political tranquility in the Land of Israel and general peace and enlightenment. Verses relating to supernatural phenomena or changes in nature during this era, for Maimonides, are metaphoric. The plain-reading approach, as adopted by Raavad, states otherwise. In his glosses (Laws of Kings and Wars 12:1) he remarks: “But does the Torah (Lev. 26:6) not state: ‘and I shall terminate harmful beasts from the Land’?” — a change of the current natural order. Although this verse does not explicitly refer to the Messianic days, it is possible that Raavad derives this notion from the beginning of that verse, “And I shall deliver peace amidst your Land, and you shall dwell and will not tremble [in fear].” Contextually, “peace” likely refers to political tranquility, which Maimonides associated with the Messianic era. Isaiah the prophet makes similar remarks about such times (Isa. 11:6): “The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them.”³

Legal Matters

Rashbam (Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir, 1085–1158), a pshat-oriented commentator to the Torah, writes in his introduction to Parashat Mishpatim (Exodus 21): “Wise people, you should know and understand that I have not come to explain the halakhot, even though they are the most important. As I explained in Genesis (1:1), the halakhot and aggadot are learned from extra [words or letters] in the text, and you will find some of these in the commentaries of my maternal grandfather, Rashi. However, I have come to explain the simple meaning of the verses. Thus I will explain the laws and the halakhot according to common sense. Nevertheless, the halakhot are of primary importance.” He distinguishes between the plain meaning of the text and the way the Rabbis interpreted the text in terms of legal practice. Rashbam would not use the pshat meaning to determine the actual law.

Raavad, however, applies his approach to more explicitly legal matters as well. Exodus 22:1-2 briefly outlines the right to self-defense in the case of burglary: “If the thief shall be found in a tunnel, and he is smitten and dies; he has no blood. If the sun shall have shone on to him, he has blood…”⁴ Based on the exegetical Talmudic reading of this verse, Maimonides (Mishne Torah: Laws of Theft 9:8) states that if a burglar’s entry is as clear as the sun of the day to be non-lethal, one may not kill in self-defense. As in the case of a father who burglarizes his son’s home for provisions, it is known that the father’s mercy towards his son is overwhelming, thus removing probable suspicion of lethal intent. On the other hand, Raavad in his glosses is adamant that while this exegetical approach holds true, one may not depart from the plain reading of the verse: “I will not refrain from recording my opinion, for it seems to me, that despite the Sages expounding on this verse… in a metaphoric manner… nonetheless, the verse may not be displaced of its plain meaning.⁵ [Thus], in the day, one may not kill him, since thieves only come [to steal] minor objects during the day and flee immediately. They do not remain stationary to steal large sums of money; to stand over the owner to kill him [as they do at night]…”

Maimonides and Raavad are dealing with the moral issue of under what conditions self-defense justifies homicide. Both agree that moral principle demands that there be evidence of violent intent on the part of the intruder. Raavad accepts the legality of the approach of Maimonides but notes that one must not then simply gloss over the plain meaning here, which is also in accordance with the moral principle.

Raavad also uses pshat as a guideline for the issue of generalization: how far can one generalize from a verse regarding halachic matters?

Upon the sudden deaths of Aaron the Priest’s sons, Leviticus 10:7 instructs a series of mourning practices to the priestly family, including the following provision: “And from the entrance of the Tent of Meeting they (the priests) shall not leave, lest they die, for the Anointing oil of The Lord is upon them…” The priests are told not to abandon their service whilst in the initial stage of mourning.⁶ Maimonides (Mishne Torah, Laws of Entering the Temple 2:5), in line with the opinion of the Sages,⁷ does not limit the application of this verse to priests of the ancient inauguration period alone; he applies it to priests of all generations. Raavad in his glosses dissents by noting: “This is a major bewilderment, as that verse was only stated regarding that time [of the Tabernacle’s inauguration], for his (Aaron the priest’s) sons were anointed [for service].” Raavad applies the passage and the punishment of divine death penalty only to the sons of Aaron, the priests — the ones anointed with the Anointing Oil — and thenceforth only to High Priests who themselves have been anointed with oil, but not to all priests. Of course, the question of generalization is a familiar halachic problem; here Raavad brings the plain reading of the verse to support his view against the opinion of Maimonides.

Among the myriad of tithes and taxes of produce that were separated for Levites and Priests by Israelite farmers, Maimonides (Mishne Torah: Laws of Tithes 1:9) records an exemption for carobs and other uncommonly eaten produce from the biblical tithing requirements. However, Raavad in his glosses points to an even more lenient exemption, based on the plain reading of several verses: “Also, all [produce] of trees other than grapes and olives [are exempt]…” Evidently, Raavad strictly construed tree tithing requirements to what the text of the Bible specifically lists: olives and grapes (Numbers 18:12, 24, 27; Deuteronomy 14:23).⁸ Here again, Raavad takes the position of non-generalization based on the plain reading of the verse.

Lastly, Maimonides (Mishne Torah: Laws of Ṭumat Tzara’at 1:6) classifies all skin diseases as part of the biblical list of such diseases, so long as the color of the patch of skin is brighter than the skin color in which it is found, noting the deviation this classification presents against the clear reading of the verse.⁹ Raavad there notes: “This [rule] was only stated by baheret, but regarding se’et, its pigmentation is darker than [the surrounding] flesh; for se’et is [textually] defined by its darkness.”¹⁰ Again, the issue is generalization, but the defense of his position is based on what is stated according to the plain meaning of the verse.

Conclusion

The Raavad is not generally considered an exegete, as he did not write a commentary on the Bible, and for this reason is left off lists of the famous pashtanim. However, a careful examination of his glosses to Mishne Torah shows that Raavad was guided by the idea of a pshat reading of the text in numerous instances. Raavad goes beyond the classical pshat-based commentators, as it is rare to find recognized Jewish legal authorities who have used this approach to Jewish law in practice.

Raavad demonstrates what for many traditional Jews today amounts to a fresh perspective on biblical legal practice. Although Raavad’s text-based rulings are far from what is accepted by the consensus of Jewish legal norms, we are reminded to be aware of both layers of biblical reading — the plain, literal meaning of the text, as well as more metaphoric interpretations. Both are indispensable when studying the Bible and understanding its message for us.