Military and Archaeological Aspects of the Conquest of Canaan in the Book of Joshua

Yigael Yadin was the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army and a noted archaeologist.

MILITARY AND ARCHEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

OF THE CONQUEST OF CANAAN

IN THE BOOK OF JOSHUA

Reprinted from ‘El HaAyin’, No. 1, World Jewish Bible Society, 1965 I would first of all like to state that I am close to the school which sees the problem connected with the probability of the story of the Conquest in a similar light as does Professor Albright. In my lecture, this evening, I concentrate mainly on the problems thrown up by the military and archeological aspects of the subject. I hope to clarify these points and to prove that as far as probability is concerned, these principles do not prevent us from accepting a considerable part of the account of the Conquest.

It is interesting and even amusing that it is mainly civilians who express doubt as to the military probability of the Book of Joshua, while military men, almost without exception, accord full authority to the military descriptions in the Book of Joshua. Recently, the British General Gale, not a biblical scholar, wrote ten articles on military tactics in the Bible. General Gale is the present Commander of the NATO forces on the Continent, whose expertness cannot be called into question, and he did not harbor the least doubt concerning these military events as described in the Bible. Thus, precisely the people not involved in military affairs doubt their probability while the experts on the subject accept it.

Before approaching the subject of the Conquest in the Book of Joshua, we need to answer a number of questions: (1) What was the system of warfare practiced in Canaan at the time of the Conquest? (2) What were the conditions in the country at that period? (3) What are the archeological facts connected with our problem? (4) The tactical points in the Book of Joshua. People have told me that they cannot imagine how tribes such as the Tribes of Israel could conquer fortified Canaanite cities. I would therefore like to explain the system adopted at that time for conquering a city. There were five possibilities. (1) To scale the city wall with ladders, as we see in most of the Egyptian reliefs. Those storming the city climb up primitive ladders, under cover of bows and other arms. (2) Through the wall – by attempting to

breach, break and ramp the wall. (3) Underneath the wall – by attempting to dig under it, penetrating into the city by way of tunnels which pass underneath the wall. (4) By means of a siege – whose purpose is to encircle the city and force the enemy to surrender as the result of famine. (5) And lastly, by a method of great importance in tactics in general and in the capture of cities in particular – by means of stratagems and cunning.

As concerns scaling the wall, this was the method employed by the Egyptians in their military period of glory, i.e. in the 18th and 19th dynasties, at the time of the great Pharaohs: Thotmes III, Amenhotep II, Seti I, Rameses II, as we see on the reliefs. We see the Egyptian army about to conquer a town, climbing up simple ladders in their endeavor to penetrate into the town. Success depends on the courage of the soldier and on his fighting ability at the point of contact where he has to overpower his adversary who has all the advantages since he stands still, well protected on top of the wall. Breaching the wall is an ancient method. At the time of the Patriarchs, the Mari period and at the beginning of the Hittite rise to power, the battering rams were invented in the north and, according to the documents, it was an efficient striking-weapon. We note with interest the complete absence of any Egyptian document of that period, either in writing or relief, which describes the making of a breach with siege-rams. Hence we learn that Egyptian conquests were achieved without the use of large and heavy siege machinery. As for the siege, this was one of the most difficult methods of warfare. Thotmes III was forced to besiege Megiddo for seven months; that is to say the other means were not sufficient to overcome the strength of Megiddo’s fortifications. Thus, not the large technical apparatus was the determining factor but the personal courage and training of the Egyptian soldier, on his skill in covering bowmen upon the ramparts.

There is not a shadow of doubt that all the nations of the period made use of the tactical ruse. An interesting illustration is the conquest of Jaffa, concerning which there is an Egyptian legend, attributed to the time of Thotmes III. The legend refers to the cunning of the Egyptian commander who succeeded in smuggling his soldiers into the city, thus overpowering the insurgents. It is immaterial whether this legend is true or not, but such legends and stories prove that this was a widespread and efficient method.

MILITARY AND ARCHEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONQUEST

The famous story of the conquest of Troy also shows that the tribes and nations of the Aegean Islands followed this practice of cunning stratagems. The conquest of a city was one of the most difficult undertakings even with the most perfect weapons. Greek and Roman literature, the compilations of stratagems from many nations, number many different types of stratagems by whose aid cities were conquered. One of these books contains a story concerning ancient Roman tribes who wanted to capture a certain city. For seven days the attacking force silently circled the city. Every day it would circle it a number of times in complete silence. The Roman author explains the stratagem as follows: When they circle it the first time, the enemy will think that now they are going to attack and he will be on the alert. The second time he will think, perhaps they will yet attack; later on he will think that the Romans are only feinting and won’t do anything at all; and then, just when the enemy was not prepared for an attack, the attackers would storm the town. Stories such as these prove the importance of the stratagem. The similarity to the story of the capture of Jericho is interesting.

Let us now deal with some other military matters in the period of the Conquest. The armies of that time had a well-developed information service by means of spies, as we see from the Egyptian historical documents. There is a story that the soldiers of Rameses caught two spies and tortured them in an attempt to get the truth out of them. The writer does not spare us an exact and detailed description of the tortures. This method of spying was developed at least as early as the 15th century BCE.

Military organization, too, was well developed. The Egyptian army in the Amarna age used rams’ horns and trumpets, both for signaling and for forming different battle formations, as shown on the Egyptian reliefs. There are reliefs of Pharaoh Rameses which show a military open camp in the field at the conquest of Kadesh. We see a square, well-arranged camp with several openings, the tent of the deity and the tent of the king, in the center. The army itself is grouped round about, some within and some without the camp. The Egyptian drawings show additional details: the battalions had standards, each unit having its own standard whose main purpose, in addition to the religious one, was to enable the different units to recognize one another. What were the weapons in use during that period? There were two principal weapons, effective in battle: the bow and the sword. Already at that time, the

compound bow was used, which is not composed of just a piece of wood, but from layers of sinews, wood and bones. This gave the bow more elastic force and a long range. The manufacture of such bows was difficult and only developed nations could master it.

As for the sword, it is strange that the nations of the Middle East (not those of the Aegean coast) at that time mainly used the sickle shaped, curved sword and not the straight one. This sword which was sharp just on the convex side, used by the Hittites, the Egyptians and by the Canaanites, also passed on to the Greeks. With this sword one neither cut nor stabbed. This sword had only one purpose: to hit with the edge of the sword. The expression ‘to smite with the edge of the sword,’ so common in all the books of the Bible, had its origin in the period which precedes the beginning of the first millennium. From then onwards, under the influence of the Aegean nations, the straight sword was used, which not only hit, but also stabbed. By the way, it amazes us in the story of Ehud that the narrator goes into details concerning Ehud’s sword (Jud. 3:16-23). The reason is that in order to understand the story, it needs to be stressed that it was not a sword for hitting but for stabbing. But since in his days the smiting sword was the rule, the narrator had to go into details and mention that this was a double-edged sword.

An additional weapon at that time, the axe, was a proper weapon for battle. We find it mentioned in Judges in connection with Abimelech (Jud. 9). The hatchet and the axe were part of the actual weapons of soldiers who went forth to do battle and also for military engineering activities. Except for these, there were no additional arms either in Pharaoh’s mighty army or in that of the smallest nation.

So far I have spoken about the military background of the period under discussion. Now I would like to deal with the situation in Canaan. External sources enable us to reconstruct a clear picture of the military power of the Canaanites which was extremely weak. This was due to the intentional policy of the Egyptian government of that period which feared two things: (1) Revolt on the part of the local population against the ruler, the non-payment of taxes, lack of safety on the highways; (2) Concern lest the cities fall into the hands of external enemies. There was thus a paradox in the policy of Pharaoh. On the one hand he was interested to have the cities strongly fortified enabling them to withstand raids by external enemies; on the other hand, he

MILITARY AND ARCHEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONQUEST

kept the Canaanites from having a large mobile army in order to prevent them from revolting and endangering his routes of communication. The Egyptian garrison ruled the country’s key cities and ensured the safety of the highways. But the vassals, called in the Bible kings of Canaan, were militarily weak.

The Tel el-Amarna Letters describe an amazing state of affairs: The king of Jerusalem complains about the Apiru (Habiru). It is obvious that the Apiru army was not as large as the armies of the large nations. They had no chariots or battering-rams. They were tribes of one kind or another who posed the greatest danger to the king of Jerusalem and his land. He wrote to Pharaoh: “If no bowmen are sent this year, all the king’s land will be lost!” Since his first letter did not help, he implored the aid of the Egyptian king’s scribe to see to it that his letter reached the king. And what does he write in this letter? “Let the king send a garrison of fifty soldiers for the defense of the country.” He needs fifty soldiers to defend the country from the Apiru. Other letters request ten, five and also three hundred soldiers. What is the meaning of these small numbers? The Egyptians intentionally made the Canaanites do without an army. Even at much later periods this was the policy of large conquering nations who sought to rule over a small nation. We learn from the letters that the Apiru brought the kings to a desperate position. It seems that the method of the Apiru was based on two tactical principles: Attacks on the highways and prevention of regular work in the fields of the Canaanites (the king complains that lands will be lost). These tribes could not overpower the Canaanite cities, so they harassed the farmers and wayfarers day and night and created chaos. That is why the kings implored for assistance. Their second tactical principle was to try and confine the Canaanites to their cities; they wanted the Canaanite king to feel safe only behind the city-walls, so that every journey be a dangerous undertaking. The roads were impassable on account of ambushes and raids, and the Canaanite ruler could not leave his city without his army – fifty to sixty men – and his chariot.

I would like to discuss an additional point. It is a fact that every Canaanite city which has been thoroughly excavated (further on I shall briefly refer to Ai and Jericho), we witness an indisputable phenomenon: a fortified Canaanite city with sanctuaries – be it Lachish or Bethel or Hazor – comes to a sudden, abrupt end. They were destroyed at one particular archeological pe-

riod. Those cities were destroyed, burnt down, but their citizens did not rebuild them. If one did rise up again, it was in a miserable and poor shape. This is an indisputable fact. About what, then, do archeologists differ? About the various absolute datings, for archeology has not yet arrived at the stage where it can state that a certain event took place in a certain year. Beyond doubt this one-time destruction was the work of the Tribes of Israel. Where Ai is concerned, archeology proved that et-Tel was uninhabited during the period of Joshua. No one doubts this archeological fact. We must here carefully distinguish between the archeological facts connected with et- Tel and the problems of Ai, since there is no proof that Ai is identical with et- Tel.

And now for Jericho: Those parts of Jericho which interest us were unfortunately “excavated” many years ago. Those periods are lost to us. Let this be a warning to archeologists: Do not hurry in removing layers from a tel. It is a fact, however, that a careful examination of the material from Jericho, according to the tables and drawings, shows that at that time – at the moment the exact date is immaterial – Jericho was inhabited. There definitely was a settlement in the Late Bronze period.

Finally, from the aspect of archeological probability, several facts require emphasis. In 1230, Merenptah states that the People of Israel was destroyed together with other peoples, which means that the People of Israel was then already in the country. This is one of the most important documents, the only one from that period which mentions Israel. There is no reason at all for despising this document and for blurring the meaning of the name Israel as some tried to do. Furthermore, Lachish, Debir, Bethel, Hazor, were destroyed simultaneously during an absolute time limit which can be assumed almost with certainty to have been between 1250 and 1200 BCE.

After this introduction it is possible to discuss the military aspect in the Book of Joshua. I do not see a complete strategic plan of Joshua’s Conquest in the picture given in the Book of Joshua. The editor or the author or the writer of the Book of Joshua expressly states that the plan he draws up is not complete. He writes (Josh. 11:18,19): Joshua made war a long time with all those kings. There was not a city that made peace with the children of Israel, save the Hivites the inhabitants of Gibeon; they took all in battle. Because he only describes part of the conquests, he adds that there were many more bat-

MILITARY AND ARCHEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONQUEST

tles which he cannot mention, therefore he sums them up in one verse. It is doubtful if we have here a complete strategic picture, though I do admit that in the actual course of the conquests, one can discern such a probability. And now for a passing remark. We read in Joshua 3:16: the waters which came down from above stood, and rose up into one heap, a great way off from Adam, the city that is beside Zarethan. In order to cross the Jordan near Jericho, there is no need for the Jordan to stand like a heap from Adam, the city. One kilometer is sufficient. We have here an echo of an information or tradition that the entrance into the Land was not only by way of Jericho, but along the whole length of the Jordan from Adam the city until Jericho. It seems reasonable to assume that one of the entrances was from there to Shechem, to the central part of the country. Perhaps it was then that this part of the country was conquered.

The tactics described in the Book of Joshua strive, first of all, to prevent battles against fortified cities. By means of cunning they get the entrenched men to leave the city so as to fight them in the open field. Hazor was most likely only destroyed after battle in the open field. The author of the Book of Joshua emphasizes the principle of sudden assault. This is a principle precious to the weak who succeed by means of surprise night forays. This is pointed out a number of times in the battle with the kings who were defeated at Gibeon (Josh. 10:9): Joshua therefore came upon them suddenly; for he went up from Gilgal all the night. And again in Chapter 11 on the conquest of Hazor: So Joshua came, and all the people of war with him, against them by the waters of Merom suddenly, and fell upon them. This battle has the character of a raid. The conquest of cities, such as Jericho and Ai, the Bible ascribes to extraordinary factors and to stratagems. I do not quite understand how Jericho was conquered; I allude to the Roman legend, which I mentioned above. As regards Ai, the position is clearer. It actually resembles that of the Trojan Horse or the baskets of the Egyptian soldiers, though the conquest of Ai also is accomplished by military ruse.

A third tactical point: to fight on the slopes and to avoid, as far as possible, fighting in the valleys, thus denying chariots (though chariots were comparatively few in number) freedom of maneuver. A fourth point: Espionage and information. Several of the stories are based on this assumption. The nature of the undertaking demands that a battle which depends on the night, the sur-

prise element and a raid, be founded on knowledge and information, for without them, this method cannot be used.

All my reasoning proves that the archeological and military principles are not opposed to the story related in the Book of Joshua; I do not say that it is proved that the events took place in accordance with what is written there, but there is no basis for claiming the contrary.

I would like to bring an example, but not from the War of Independence, for the following reasons: (1) because it is known to us; (2) conditions differed from the strategic aspect, though they have one thing in common which we have ourselves experienced and because of which great military leaders consider the Bible story probable. We see that spirit and morale are the most important elements from the military aspect. These elements makes possible the seemingly improbable. But, I shall not enlarge on this.

I shall produce proof from the conquest of the country by the Arabs. In this conquest I see an astonishing analogy, not only as concerns details, but in general, with the events in Joshua’s time. After the death of Muhammad, his successor, Abu Bekr, sends two prongs of tribes to seize Palestine. He sends men with ‘Amr ibn’ to the southern part of the country, and with Abu Obeida in the direction of Moab, to the east of the Dead Sea. Later on, Khalid ibn Welid joins them opposite Jericho from the direction of Damyieh, and the three together march upon Palestine. In the space of a few years, unorganized nomadic tribes who had come from the south, defeated an empire which was certainly stronger than the Canaanite empire. How did this happen? The citizens of this empire lacked morale and they lacked fighting strength. As against this, the men who came against them were both religious and political fanatics, and the Byzantines were not able to withstand them for more than a couple of years. Even the archeological picture of that period resembles the archeological finds of the period of the Israelite Conquest: Byzantine ruins and next to them the beginnings of Arab settlement; in certain parts, the conquering Arab assumed rulership and intermingled with the remaining Byzantines.

The example of the Arab conquest is instructive how such tribes could bring down great nations. It was not a one-time conquest but there were onetime preparations, daring raids and destruction of cities one after the other. And what is the meaning of the repeated emphasis of the Book of Joshua,

MILITARY AND ARCHEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONQUEST

And Joshua returned, and all Israel with him, unto the camp to Gilgal? This verse emphasizes the character of the war – each time they go forth from a certain place, on a military expedition or raid. Thus, the military and archeological arguments and the Arab example prove the probability of the story of the Conquest in the Book of Joshua even in its details.

עשה תורת קבע

THE TRIENNIAL BIBLE READING CALENDAR

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF

CHAIM ABRAMOWITZ

January Exodus 1 - 27

February Exodus 28 - 40

Leviticus 1 - 15

March Leviticus 16 - 27

Numbers 1 - 16

April Numbers 17 - 36

Deuteronomy 1 - 8

May Deuteronomy 9 - 34