The Lesson at Marah

Introduction

After the Israelites cross the Red Sea, Exodus 15:22-26 tells of their first experience in the desert. They arrive at a place called Marah (“bitter”) where the water is bitter and thus undrinkable. The people complain to Moses, and the Lord shows Moses a special tree; when put into the water, the tree renders the water drinkable. And then, vv. 25b-26 conclude the narrative in a puzzling way: there he set for him law and statute [sam lo ḥoq umišpat], and there he tested him [nissahu]. And he said, if you will truly listen to the voice of the Lord your God, and do that which is right in His eyes, and listen to His commandments, and keep all His laws, I will not place on you any of the diseases which I placed on the Egyptians - for I am the Lord your healer.¹ There are many questions we can ask about these enigmatic verses. Who is the subject, the “he,” in each of these sentences? What is the meaning of “set for someone law and statute”? What is the test? And what is the connection between v. 25b, v. 26, and the story which precedes them?

As a first step toward answering these questions, we need to consider two things: the structure of v. 25b, and to whom the grammatical subjects and objects in vv. 25b-26 refer.

Structure, Subjects and Objects

Verse 25b consists of two short clauses which share a common structure. They both begin with the word “there,” followed by a verb in the third-person perfect form plus the object “him.” In 1878, Wellhausen² described these two clauses as “a dislocated poetical fragment” due no doubt to this common structure, but Lohfink maintains that these clauses do not conform to poetic structure.³ Certainly whether these clauses are synonymously parallel (or perhaps synthetically parallel in the sense that the second clause explains or extends the meaning of the first) is open to question,⁴ and the stress rhythm of the two clauses may not conform to one of the normal rhythms of Biblical poetic bicola.⁵ Whatever the case, the two clauses have a closely parallel structure. In light of this, there would appear to be a strong probability that their author intended them to be somehow connected to each other in terms of meaning as well.

Each clause of v. 25b begins with the subject “he”. To whom does this refer? In v. 25a, the subject changes with each new clause: Moses is the subject of the first clause (And he cried out to the Lord), the Lord is the subject of the second clause (and the Lord showed him a tree), and Moses returns to being the subject of the third clause (he threw it into the water). As to the clauses of v. 25b, their parallel structure argues that each of the two clauses probably has the same subject; that subject could be the Lord or it could be Moses. But if Moses is the subject, the verse would be saying that Moses tested the people, something that never occurs elsewhere in the Pentateuch; it is always either the Lord who tests the people, or vice versa. This seems to indicate that the Lord has returned to being the subject in both clauses of v. 25b; note that this would be in keeping with the pattern of shifts in subjects established in v. 25a (Moses, the Lord, Moses, and now the Lord once again). All the commentators I will discuss in this article, from the Babylonian Talmud on, assume that this is so.

In v. 26, the subject and speaker “he” appears at first to be Moses: And he said, if you will truly listen to the voice of the Lord your God, etc. Seeing Moses as the subject maintains the alternating pattern established in v. 25. But then the verse continues by switching to the first person: …I will not place on you any of the diseases which I placed on the Egyptians - for I am the Lord your healer. Who is speaking, Moses or the Lord? Many commentators have noted that when Moses speaks, he often slips into first person as though the Lord Himself is speaking.⁶ However, when the Lord speaks He too sometimes speaks of Himself in the third person and then switches to first person (see for example Exodus 23:25). Although there are commentators on both sides of this issue,⁷ it seems easiest to me to take the subject/speaker in v. 26 as the Lord (along the lines of Exodus 23:25).⁸

Who, then, is the object “him” in the two clauses of v. 25b? It could be Moses or the people, since in Hebrew “him” could also be translated “it,” i.e. the people. Since v. 26 seems to be offering a more detailed explanation of v. 25b, we can probably get a clue from the identity of the object “you” in v. 26. There it makes most sense to assume that the Lord is not only promising healing to Moses alone but to the entire people. Since the Lord is the subject in the two clauses in v. 25b, it seems most natural that the object “him” in v. 25b is the entire people as well. This is the assumption of all the commentators I cite in this article.

As a result of the above considerations, we can translate v. 25b as follows: There He set for them [the people] law and statute, and there He tested them. Now we are ready to review how prior commentators have dealt with Exodus 15:22-26 and the questions raised about it.

Previous Attempts to Explain the Passage

TB Sanhedrin 56b⁹ and the medieval Jewish commentators Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Ramban see the first clause of v. 25b as referring to specific laws revealed by the Lord to the people, laws which are neither explicitly stated or even inferable from the text. As to the second clause of v. 25b, these commentators generally see the “test” as referring to the lack of drinkable water, which would test whether the people would seek help from the Lord or complain against Him and Moses ungratefully.¹⁰ However, it doesn’t seem important to the text whether the people passed this supposed test or not; there is no indication in the text as to whether the people passed or failed the test (e.g., neither praise nor punishment). Also note that these commentators explain these structurally parallel clauses as referring to two completely unconnected things. Finally, these commentators do not show how these clauses might lead in to the Lord’s speech in v. 26 in a way that makes sense.

Since the 1800’s, academic biblical scholars have generally divided Exodus 15:22-26 into three sections: the itinerary notice in v. 22a which belongs, in their view, to the P document; the story itself (vv. 22b-25a), which they assign to the J document; and vv. 25b-26, which they believe were added by a Deuteronomistic writer.¹¹ The theory that vv. 25b-26 is a later addition is based on the observation that a “discontinuity” seems to exist between vv. 25a and 25b; the second doesn’t seem to flow smoothly from the first. Vv. 25b-26, with their focus on “laws and statutes” and the people’s obedience, have no clear connection to the story which precedes them; the story is not about laws or the people’s obedience at all. The theory that they were added by a Deuteronomistic writer is based both on their content (the concern with laws, testing and obedience, which are all especially prominent in Deuteronomy) and their language, especially the use of the phrase ḥoq umišpat which is particularly featured in Deuteronomy (albeit in the plural form ḥuqim umišpatim). Martin Noth,¹² Brevard Childs¹³ and George Coats¹⁴ provide a few valuable insights, but none of them successfully explain the clauses in v. 25b and their relationship to the story which precedes them and the conclusion which follows them.

William H.C. Propp calls attention to the appearance of the phrase ḥoq umišpat (which he translates “rule and law”) not only in Joshua 24:25 (as did Ramban) but also in I Samuel 30:25. However, he emphasizes that the phrase is used differently in these two texts: in Joshua, “rule and law” refers to a “general exhortation,” whereas in I Samuel it refers to the enactment of a specific practice.¹⁵ For Propp, “rule and law” in Exodus 15:25b is a sort of general exhortation referring to “the comprehensive commandment of obedience.” In addition, the “test” refers to that same comprehensive commandment as well. Thus although he does not note the parallel structure of the two clauses in v. 25b, Propp nevertheless sees those two clauses as related in meaning.

Although Propp points out that the phrase “set for someone rule and law” appears to be a fixed phrase which appears in the same form in three different biblical texts, he does not explain it in the same way in all of those texts. In my view, this constitutes a weakness in his explanation. Also, it is not the people who are commanded to obey the Lord in the story; it is Moses who is instructed and then obeys. Therefore, according to Propp, the “setting of rule and law” that occurred at Marah refers to a general exhortation that the people obey the Lord in the future. This means that the connection between v. 25b and the story which precedes it requires the presence of v. 26, which we must understand to be drawing an analogy between the benefit derived from Moses’ obedience at Marah and the benefit to be derived from the people’s obedience in the future. Although Propp does not propose this explicitly, it is certainly a possibility. However, Propp’s view of the “test” is difficult to accept. Since according to the text the “test” occurs at Marah, that test cannot refer to future obedience to the Lord. The test cannot be obedience to the laws that will be given later; it must be related to what occurred at Marah.

Dozeman’s¹⁶ explanation is very similar to Propp’s. He sees the phrase “set for them law and statute” as a general exhortation to the people to accept the principle of law in general as the basis for the Lord’s future relationship with them. However, this is a very different meaning than the phrase has in other places where it is used. Dozeman’s view of the “test” is the same as Propp’s, and is subject to the same difficulty. However, Dozeman explicitly states the possible connection between v. 26 and the narrative preceding it: the Lord promises that just as Moses followed His instruction on how to make the water drinkable, the people can ensure their health if they will follow His “instructions,” i.e. laws, in the future. However, he does not argue that any specific words in Exodus 15:22-26 invite the reader to make this analogy; the analogy must be inferred by the reader from v. 26 alone.

To summarize: many of the commentators I have reviewed provide useful suggestions; Propp and Dozeman especially attempt to link v. 25b to v. 26 and both to the story which precedes them. However, none of them completely succeed in offering a satisfactory unified explanation of Exodus 15:22-26.

The Explanation of Rabbi Samuel Ben Meir (Rashbam)

In contrast to the commentators I have discussed, Rashbam (12th century) explains the entire text as a completely integrated logical unit. In his view, the clause There He set for them law and statute in v. 25b does not refer to any specific laws. It concludes the preceding story by saying that “there,” i.e. by means of what happened there, He taught them a general rule or principle, namely that following His instructions will result in His taking care of their needs. In the second clause, Rashbam explains that the word nissahu [He “tested” them] means something other than its usual meaning of “test.” His explanation is based on the insight that what happened at Marah was not really a test. The normal purpose of a test is to see how those being tested react or respond, and here the text offers no assessment of the people’s response. Rashbam explains that the word here has the meaning lehochiaḥ (usually translated “to prove”), i.e. to afflict someone with a difficult or rigorous experience in order to demonstrate something to him.¹⁷ The difficult experience is the lack of drinkable water. The Lord arranged for this difficult situation to occur so as to be able to show the people by means of an object lesson how the general principle - that following His instructions would result in His taking care of their needs - was true. Rashbam offers no evidence for any of his views. However, in his commentary to Exodus 20:17 he uses the same word lehochiaḥ to explain the verb nissah: to put you through a difficult and frightening experience so that you will learn something from it. Luzzatto and Cassuto, without citing Rashbam, propose this same explanation of nissah in Exodus 15:25b.¹⁸

Rashbam thus sees the two clauses of v. 25b as connected in meaning, referring to the same thing in different words: the Lord taught them a general principle, and He did so by putting them through a difficult experience, i.e. He taught them by means of an object lesson. The story constitutes a form of teaching through experience, and once the experience is over, the general lesson to be learned is explicitly stated in v. 26 (anticipating Dozeman’s explanation): if in the future the people will follow the Lord’s orders just as Moses did at Marah, He will protect them from disease.

Rashbam thus explains our text as an integrated whole, but he provides little support for his views of the meaning of the two clauses of v. 25b or of v. 26. However, there is a good deal of evidence to support his explanation, as I will now show.

To Set for Someone Law and Statute

Biblical scholars have long recognized that the words ḥoq [law/decree] and mišpat [statute], while sometimes used separately to denote different things, are often used in biblical Hebrew as a binomial expression (i.e. two nouns connected by the conjunction “and”). The frequency with which this expression appears argues that it is used as an idiom having one meaning, similar to “kith and kin” in English meaning “relatives.” This is especially true of the plural form; ḥuqim umišpatim is regularly used as an idiom meaning “laws.” The words are also used as a synonymous parallel pair in biblical poetry (Psalms 18:23 and 81:5) as well as in prose that is structured with a parallelistic style (e.g., Leviticus 26:15).¹⁹

The expression ḥoq umišpat (in the singular) occurs only four times in biblical prose: Exodus 15:25, Joshua 24:25, I Samuel 30:25 and Ezra 7:10.²⁰ However, while Ezra 7:10 states that Ezra taught “law and statute” to Israel, the other three texts cited contain the binomial expression as part of the phrase “set for someone law and statute.”²¹ The appearance of this same phrase in three separate places suggests that it may be functioning in a special idiomatic way, and is not just another way of saying “teach or give someone laws.” If the phrase is indeed an idiom, one would expect the phrase to have the same meaning in all three places.

In I Samuel 30, David and his six hundred men return to the Judean town of Ziklag, where they had left their families, to find that the Amalekites had looted and burned it, carrying off the women and children as captives. David and his men give chase and find the raiders, but two hundred of his men are so exhausted by the pursuit that they do not participate in the actual battle but stay with the supplies. When David and his remaining four hundred men return, having defeated the Amalekites and recovered the women, children and spoils, some of those four hundred say that only those who actually fought deserve a share of the spoils; those who stayed with the supplies can take their wives and children, but they should not expect anything more. Verses 24-25 give David’s response to their view: Who could agree with you on this matter? Those who went to battle and those who stayed with the supplies - they will share equally [in the spoils]. From that day onward he set this as law and as statute for Israel [vay’simeha l’ḥoq ul’mišpat l’yisra’el] until the present day.

Since David has made only one decision, that decision can’t be both a law (meaning one thing) and a statute (meaning something different); thus, the phrase “law and statute” can’t refer to two different kinds of law here, but must be an idiomatic way of referring to one thing. And that one thing is not “law” in the collective, plural sense either (as in Ezra 7:10) (or a “law code,” per Johnstone). Here, based on an actual experience, David makes a decision and he establishes (“sets”) that decision as a general rule, an accepted and binding practice for the future, a precedent for Israel whenever the same situation may occur.²²

The second text in which the phrase “set for someone law and statute” appears is Joshua 24:25. Joshua 24:2-24, which precedes our verse, consists of a speech (vv. 2-13) that Joshua makes to the assembled nation in Shechem, and a verbal exchange with the people (vv. 14-24) after that speech. In the speech, he reviews all of the things that the Lord has done for the nation up to then. In the following verbal exchange, he challenges the people to decide whom they will worship: the Lord who did all this for them, or other gods. The people insist that they will be loyal to the Lord alone.

Verse 25 then states: And Joshua made a covenant for the people on that day, and he set for them law and statute [vayasem lo ḥoq umišpat] in Shechem. This verse consists of two clauses that have the same structure. Both begin with a transitive verb in the imperfect preceded by a waw (made / set) and have the same subject (Joshua / he); these are followed by the combination of a direct object (a covenant / law and statute) and a prepositional phrase that relates to the same group (for the people / for them); and both conclude with an adverbial phrase beginning with the preposition b’ [on/in], one of time and one of place (on that day / in Shechem). The fact that these clauses are structurally parallel mirrors what we noted to be the setting of the phrase “set for them law and statute” in Exodus 15:25b.

Rashi comments that law and statute in Joshua 24:25 refers to all the laws of the Torah, which the people reaccepted in Shechem.²³ In other words, the verbal exchange in Joshua 24:14-24 is a recommitment of the people to the previous covenants with the Lord and the laws recorded by Moses in the Torah. The making of the covenant and the setting for the people of law and statute refer to two different aspects of the same event (and are thus connected in meaning); the covenant made is a recommitment to the covenants made at Sinai and in Moab, and the “setting of ‘law and statute’” is that part of those covenants that comprises the obligations of the people thereunder.

This explanation, however, has two serious difficulties. First, the history of Israel which Joshua recounts makes absolutely no mention of the prior covenants. Furthermore, those covenants and the laws given by the Lord to the people as part of those covenants are not mentioned in v. 25. If the text was recording a reacceptance of those covenants, we would expect some explicit reference to them. The Book of Joshua refers to the Torah of Moses many times, but it does not do so here; all that is mentioned is the people’s insistence that they will be loyal to the Lord exclusively, and Joshua’s making a covenant “for” the people. It is easiest to assume that the covenant refers in some way to the people’s commitment to be loyal to the Lord, and not to a mass of laws that could have been referenced but are not.²⁴ Secondly, we saw that the phrase “set law and statute” in I Samuel 30:25 refers not to “laws” generally, but rather to a decision based on a real-life experience that became a binding precedent for the future. Rashi’s explanation of Joshua 24:25 does not fit with this meaning; if we adopt his explanation, we are forced to explain the same set phrase in two different texts in two different ways. If we could explain the phrase in the same way in both texts, such an explanation would strengthen the idea that the phrase is a fixed idiom.²⁵

What does the text mean by saying that Joshua made a covenant “for” the people? Normally, a covenant is made between two parties in which both parties commit to certain responsibilities. However, there is no second party specified here; it is difficult to say that the second party is the Lord, because (aside from the fact that He is not mentioned as a party) the Lord demands nothing and commits Himself to nothing here. Although neither Rashi nor Radak address this question, Ralbag writes as follows: “Joshua made a covenant for the people - that they would serve the Lord.” In other words, Ralbag explains that the covenant refers to the people’s decision to serve God exclusively; their taking this obligation upon themselves is what is referred to as a covenant. Both Metzudat David and Malbim also explain the words in this way, arguing that the “covenant” in this verse is not to be understood in the normal way as an agreement between two sides but rather as a one-sided, solemn commitment among the members of a group, a declaration-promise binding upon them forever as a nation which Joshua, in this ceremony, makes “official” for them.

We can explain the meaning of Joshua 24:25 along these lines in a way which is consistent with its meaning in I Samuel 30:25. After reviewing the history (i.e., the past experience) of Israel, Joshua challenges the people to commit to exclusive loyalty to the Lord who did so much for them, and the people agree. Then come the structurally parallel clauses in verse 25: And Joshua made a covenant for the people on that day – in a solemn ceremony in the Lord’s sanctuary he elicited this commitment from the people – and he set for them law and statute in Shechem – through this ceremony he established (“set”) this experience-based decision of theirs as a binding precedent for their future action, a closely-related way of describing this covenant.²⁶ We can thus see that there is a connection of meaning as well as a parallelism of structure between the two clauses of v. 25b, and the meaning of the phrase that we arrived at in I Samuel 30:25 fits the context here as well.²⁷

Returning to Exodus 15:25b, Rashbam’s explanation of set for them law and statute as an idiom seems to be the best understanding of the phrase. The meaning is consistent with the explanation of the phrase in I Samuel 30:25 and Joshua 24:25. In I Samuel, the fixed phrase refers to a specific decision reached as an outcome of a specific experience, and established as a binding precedent for future similar situations. In Joshua, the fixed phrase refers to a more general decision to commit to a general pattern of behavior based on a series of experiences, and to take that behavioral pattern as a binding precedent for the future. In Exodus 15:25b, the fixed phrase refers to the divine establishment, as an outgrowth of the people’s experience at Marah, of a general precedent as to how the relationship between the Lord and His people will work in the future. Thus in all three instances the fixed phrase “set for someone law and statute” refers to the establishment of either a specific decision or a general principle arrived at as a result of experience(s), which acquires binding force and serves as a precedent which will guide action in the future.

And There He Tested Them

We must now address the problem created by the common translation of the second clause in Exodus 15:25b and there He tested them [nissahu]. If the verb nissah means “test,” none of the proposed explanations of what that test was and whether the people passed or failed it are adequate. We have seen that Rashbam, Luzzato and Cassuto all suggest that the term nissah may better be understood as “to subject someone to a difficult or rigorous experience for the purpose of teaching them something.” Two other commentators provide additional evidence and arguments in favor of this understanding.

Eissfeldt²⁸ writes that there are a number of cases where the verb nissah may better be translated as “practice” or “train” in a military-technical sense. He cites I Samuel 17:39, where David declines to use Saul’s armor because, as David says, lo’ nissiti; while the translation “I haven’t tested (them)” could be used, Eissfeldt argues that the meaning is more accurately expressed as “I haven’t practiced” or “trained” (with them). Similarly, Judges 3:1 says that the Lord left some nations in Canaan l’nassot bam ’et yisra’el, usually translated “to test Israel with them;” but the text continues in v. 2 to explain that those nations were left so as to teach future generations of Israelites, who had no direct experience of the conquest of the land, the skills of war. The translation “to train Israel by means of them” is thus more appropriate to the context.²⁹

Eissfeldt claims that the use of the verb nissah in Exodus 15:25b may have the same sense of “trained.” Childs³⁰ points out that this theory “is not supported by the context of the narrative.” While it is true that the narrative in Exodus 15:22-26 does not have a military context, there is no reason why the verb nissah must necessarily mean “train” in a strictly military sense, but “train” in the wider sense proposed by Rashbam of “subject someone to a difficult experience in order to teach them something,” i.e. “teach by means of a difficult object lesson.”

Greenberg develops this idea in his examination of Exodus 20:17.³¹ In that verse, the verb nassot couldn’t possibly refer to a “test;” if the theophany is a “test,” it can’t be testing whether the people will obey the Lord’s commandments in the future. Rashbam, as we have seen, explains this word by use of the word hochiaḥ both here and in Exodus 15:25b; Greenberg further notes that Ramban suggests a possible meaning for nassot in Exodus 20:17 as “train you” [hirgilchem, i.e. “get you used to”], and Ramban cites I Samuel 17:39 as another instance where David uses the verb nissiti to mean “I’m not used to them.” Greenberg also cites Deuteronomy 28:56 which speaks of the most delicate of women ‘asher lo’ nisstah chaf raglah hatzeg ’al ha’aretz, which he translates “who never experienced setting the sole of her foot on the ground” (or, “the sole of her foot was never used to touching the ground”). Greenberg then notes that verbs in the pi’el stem which have no qal presentation often develop a causative meaning; thus nissah may also be used in the sense of “to cause someone to have experience of something,” “to get someone used to something.” This, he writes, is how the verb is used in Judges 3:1 (“to give Israel the experience of them”), as well as in Ecclesiastes 2:1 (“let me cause you to experience pleasure”). By comparing Exodus 20:17 with the account of the theophany at Sinai given in Deuteronomy 4-5, Greenberg concludes that nassot in Exodus 20:17 means “to give Israel a direct, palpable experience” of the Lord, an experience which teaches them that they can hear His voice and witness His descent from heaven with all their senses and not only survive but be convinced of the truth of it all.

Although Greenberg doesn’t refer to Exodus 15:25b, we can use his explanation along with Eissfeldt’s idea of “training” to back up the view of Rashbam, Luzzato and Cassuto as to the meaning of that verse. We can best understand vešam nissahu as meaning “and there He caused them to have a difficult experience that taught them something,” i.e. “and there He gave them a difficult/rigorous object lesson.” Thus we can see the two clauses of v. 25b as parallel not only in structure but also in meaning. The clauses summarize the import of the story that precedes it by stating that, based on the people’s experience at Marah, the Lord established a precedent on which His relationship with the people in the future would be based, and He did so by means of a difficult experience which taught this to them as an object lesson.

Verse 26 as a Conclusion to Our Text

Both Ibn Ezra and Ramban propose an interesting possible connection between v. 26 and the story in vv. 22-25a. They see the changing of the waters from undrinkable to drinkable as constituting a sort of “healing,” and thus they write that the Lord’s promise in v. 26 to be the nation’s “healer” may relate to the fact that the Lord “healed” the undrinkable waters. Childs also suggests this possibility. However, none of these commentators offer any evidence to support their proposal. Rashbam proposes this as well, and as evidence that rendering water safely drinkable is called “healing” it, he cites II Kings 2:21. This citation provides additional evidence that the biblical authors recognized that “bad” water can cause physical harm to those who drink it (see II Kings 2:19). However, the citation can also help us to understand what may seem to us to be a logical problem both within v. 26 and in its relationship to the preceding story. In v. 26, the Lord states that in return for obedience, He will not afflict the people with the diseases of Egypt because He is their healer. For us, a “healer” is someone who cures a person of a disease they already have. But if the Lord prevents the people from being sick, calling Himself their “healer” doesn’t appear relevant. Additionally, in the story the people don’t get sick from drinking the water; they apparently know they shouldn’t drink the water because it is harmful, and thus they simply don’t drink it. Therefore, they don’t need to be healed, and thus the conclusion in v. 26 that the Lord will “heal” (i.e., cure) them doesn’t seem to agree with what happens in the story.

Rashbam’s citation of II Kings 2:21 shows that in biblical Hebrew the root r.f.‘. covers both curing a harmful and painful bodily condition, and preventing one by removing its cause. In Exodus, the Lord’s advice prevents harm; in v. 26, the root r.f.’. is used to mean that just as following the Lord’s instructions eliminated the harmful nature of the waters at Marah (i.e., “healed” them) and thus prevented a painful loss of health, so in return for obedience to the Lord’s instructions in the future the Lord will prevent the people from experiencing the diseases they had seen in Egypt. Rashbam thus anticipates Dozeman’s explanation.³²

This explanation requires us to note one final difference between modern views and the biblical view. Verse 26 seems to equate what the “bitter” waters at Marah would cause the people to experience if they drank them, with maḥalah, which we translate as “disease” (or “epidemic”). Our modern concept of “disease” doesn’t include temporary abnormal or painful bodily reactions to drinking bad-tasting water. Only if, for example, the water contains harmful microorganisms would we consider the resulting condition a “disease.” The biblical author doesn’t distinguish between these different types of abnormal or painful bodily conditions. In the Bible, all of these conditions are included under the idea of maḥalah, which is therefore not what we today would call “disease” but any abnormal or painful bodily state (“dis-health”) not produced by physical injury.³³ The fact that v. 26 equates the possible results of drinking the waters at Marah and the maḥalot which the people had experienced in Egypt is thus understandable.

Conclusion

After examining Exodus 15:22-26 in detail, and presenting various attempts to understand it as an integrated unit, my conclusion is that Rashbam’s explanation must be the basis for a complete understanding of this text. The two clauses of Exodus 15:25b constitute a summary and evaluation of the import of the story in vv. 22-25a. Support was demonstrated for understanding the phrase sam lo ḥoq umišpat as an idiom meaning “establish a precedent for the future based on prior experience,” and for understanding the phrase vešam nissahu as “and there He subjected them to a difficult experience to teach/train them,” i.e. to give them a difficult object lesson. Furthermore, these two phrases are not only parallel in structure but are closely connected in meaning, just as the two clauses of Joshua 24:25 are also parallel in structure and connected in meaning. Finally, I have offered additional arguments to support Rashbam’s explanation of v. 26 as the more detailed statement of the precedent the people were taught. It presents an analogy between the Lord’s power to protect the people against natural situations which can cause unhealth as seen in the story, and His power to protect the people against such unhealthy states in the future, as long as they follow His instructions, i.e. His laws. Finally, this explanation of Exodus 15:22-26 is valid whether we theorize that the text was written by one author or by multiple authors.